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EVISCERATING A HEALTHY CHURCH-STATE 
SEPARATION 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY* 
BARRY P. MCDONALD** 
INTRODUCTION 
In its recent ruling in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. 
Comer,1 the U.S. Supreme Court took an extraordinary step in a remarkably 
facile way. For the first time in its history, the Court ruled that the United 
States Constitution requires states under certain circumstances to provide 
taxpayer funds to churches and other houses of worship. The Court relied 
on the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution to force the State of Missouri 
to provide funding to a church in contravention of an anti-establishment 
clause contained in that State’s own constitution. 
Why an extraordinary step? Because deeply ingrained in the history of 
American religious freedom is a fight against coerced taxpayer funding of 
religious communities to protect rights of religious conscience and a healthy 
separation of church and state. This no-funding principle was reflected in 
many of the constitutions of the original states, in the federal Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses as they came to be understood soon after 
adoption, and in provisions of most state constitutions adopted later in the 
nineteenth century that remain in place today.2 
Why a remarkably facile way? Because with nary a nod to these historic 
concerns, the Court treated the anti-establishment clause of the Missouri 
Constitution—which bars including religious organizations in a taxpayer-
funded benefits program—as a form of invidious religious discrimination 
that warranted strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.3 In other 
words, the Court viewed the application of Missouri’s anti-establishment 
clause—which has been in its constitution since the nineteenth century and 
readopted in 1945—as being comparable to a Florida city’s criminalization 
of a minority religious sect in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
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1. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
2. See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
3. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2021–25. 











Hialeah.4 Not only was the Court’s dismissive attitude towards Missouri’s 
anti-establishment choices profoundly ahistoric and hypocritical for Justices 
that profess in other areas to care strongly about federalism and 
originalism,5 but its reliance on the federal Free Exercise Clause to force 
public funding of churches was particularly perverse given the early 
understanding of free exercise rights that developed in our country which 
barred such funding. 
Moreover, what the Court’s decision essentially means is that 
communities of religious worship will be entitled to participate in taxpayer-
funded grant programs on a par with secular organizations—at least to the 
extent churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, etc. can plausibly 
characterize the use of the funds as being for secular purposes.6 But as the 
Court has itself recognized in other cases, money is fungible and when 
saved in one place more money is freed up to be used in others7— 
particularly to bolster spending designed to promote a community’s 
religious beliefs. Although some may view this as a desirable development, 
for a nation committed to the principle of religious freedom—including the 
right of taxpayers not to have their monies going to support religious beliefs 
and practices they do not agree with—it is a striking blow to the healthy 
separation of church and state. 
One might attempt to defend the Court for falling into this error on at 
least four different grounds. First, the seemingly innocuous facts of the 
Trinity Lutheran case itself, involving as it did funding for playground 
                                                          
4. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
5. See infra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
6. A plurality of the Court purported to limit its decision to religious funding for secular 
purposes, even though Justices Thomas and Gorsuch expressly disagreed with this point. See Trinity 
Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3. As we will argue, this qualification will likely be abandoned quickly 
by the conservative majority of the Court, and is illusory in any event. See infra notes 157–69 and 
accompanying text. Indeed, as this Article was nearing publication, the Court declined to hear an appeal 
of a New Jersey Supreme Court ruling that the grant of monies to active churches from a historic building 
preservation fund violated a “no religious aid” provision in its state constitution, an interpretation which 
did not violate the federal Free Exercise Clause because the funds were being put to the religious uses 
of repairing churches so that they could continue to offer worship services. Tellingly, the freshman 
Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a pointed statement respecting the denial of certiorari, joined by Justices 
Alito and Gorsuch, in which he effectively asserted that the state supreme court’s ruling violated Trinity 
Lutheran (although half-heartedly defending the denial due to an ambiguous factual record and how 
recent the Trinity Lutheran ruling was). See Morris County v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 586 
U.S. __ (2019) (statement of Kavanaugh, J.). This statement indicates that at least three of the five 
conservative members of the Court are signaling lower courts that they should read Trinity Lutheran as 
prohibiting government from denying generally available funding to eligible religious societies even 
when the funds will be put to religious uses. This Article will argue that such an interpretation of the 
federal Free Exercise Clause is seriously misplaced.  
7. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 37 (2010) (in upholding ban on 
providing support to terrorist groups that included counseling terrorist organizations in peaceful means 
of dispute resolution, asserting that “[m]oney is fungible . . . and Congress logically concluded that 
money a terrorist group such as the PKK obtains using the techniques plaintiffs propose to teach could 












resurfacing, may have played a key role in the Court’s decision.8 Second, 
the way the Court’s more conservative justices have modernly loosened up 
federal Establishment Clause constraints on voluntary choices made by 
various government entities to include religious institutions in public 
spending programs. Third, the Court’s incorporation of federal 
Establishment Clause protections against state and local government actions 
despite the fact that that clause was originally designed in part to bar federal 
interference with state establishment choices. And fourth, the surface allure 
of the late Justice Antonin Scalia’s biting dissent in an earlier case posing 
an issue similar to Trinity Lutheran—which essentially provided the Court 
with a roadmap for its current decision. But none of these reasons justify the 
Court’s holding. 
As to the facts of Trinity Lutheran, Missouri had rolled out a grant 
program to help eligible non-profit organizations use recycled tires to give 
their playgrounds rubber surfaces—paid for by a special tax placed on tire 
purchasers.9 When the daycare center of a church applied for a grant, it was 
denied on the basis of an anti-establishment clause in the Missouri 
Constitution because the center was operated as a ministry of the church.10 
Now, to deny a church’s daycare center money to resurface its playground 
simply because it is a church, might seem harsh and unfair even though 
Missouri is hardly a state known for animosity towards religion. But the 
Court’s treatment of the State’s decision as being tantamount to such 
animosity—thus justifying the strong medicine of strict scrutiny—was 
wrongheaded not only because it rested on false premises but also because 
of the dangerous precedent the case sets. After this decision, any time a state 
declines to provide funding to devotional institutions when it adopts a public 
spending program, the state’s action will likely be subject to strict scrutiny 
and invalidated. Such compelled public funding of churches and other 
worship institutions is, in important part, what free exercise and anti-
establishment clauses in federal and state constitutions were historically 
understood to prevent.11  
The second potential ground of defense fares no better. The Warren and 
                                                          
8. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2014–15. 
9. Id. at 2017. 
10. See id. at 2017–18. The pertinent provision of the Missouri Constitution provides, “That no 
money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or 
denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that 
no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, 
or any form of religious faith or worship.” MO. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
11. See infra notes 31–113 and accompanying text. For an incisive critique of the Trinity 
Lutheran decision that makes related points about the Court’s improper casting of Missouri’s actions as 
involving invidious discrimination, the ahistoric nature of the decision, and its inconsistency with 
federalism principles, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: Paradigm 
Lost?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV., 2016–2017, at 131. 











Burger Courts generally interpreted the federal Establishment Clause to 
mean that voluntary public aid to religious institutions, and particularly 
private religious schools, could not impermissibly advance their religious 
objectives.12 In other words, under the test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,13 such 
funding had to be neutral towards religion—it had to be part of a program 
with a secular purpose that was generally available to secular and religious 
institutions alike, and could not impermissibly advance an institution’s 
religious mission.14 However, more conservative majorities on the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have shifted the Establishment Clause 
neutrality calculus to essentially require facial neutrality only. Public 
funding still needs to be through a generally available secular program, but 
so long as it is, it becomes irrelevant to what extent the funding may 
disproportionately benefit religious institutions and their missions.15 
Moreover, those same majorities have tightened the rules of standing for 
bringing Establishment Clause claims, essentially insulating many public 
funding programs that benefit religious institutions from judicial review.16 
The overall result of these developments is to allow more public aid to flow 
to religious institutions, and particularly Roman Catholic schools, should 
government entities decide to make it available. 
Yet it is one thing to alter federal constitutional rules to permit this result, 
but quite another to impose such norms on states through the federal Free 
Exercise Clause by requiring them to make available funding to religious 
institutions, whenever they make it available to secular organizations, if 
their own establishment clause rules prohibit it. This coerced conformance 
to federal Establishment Clause norms not only is profoundly disrespectful 
to federalism values the conservative majorities often extoll,17 but also flies 
in the face of the early historical understanding of religious freedom despite 
the fact that the conservatives frequently emphasize the importance of such 
understandings to constitutional interpretation.18  
This brings us to the third potential ground of defense—that the historical 
understanding of the federal Establishment Clause’s purpose to in part 
protect state establishment choices from federal interference was jettisoned 
                                                          
12. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
14. See infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
17. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (quoting New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)) (“Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between 
different institutions of government for their own integrity. ‘State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: 
“Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.”’”). 
18. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (more conservative members 
of the Court relying exclusively upon a historical analysis of the Second Amendment to determine its 












by the Court when it incorporated that clause against state and local action 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.19 Justice 
Clarence Thomas has often inveighed against the logic of incorporating 
federal Establishment Clause protections against state action when it was 
designed in part to protect state establishment choices.20 Yet Justice Thomas 
was curiously silent on this point in joining the majority opinion in Trinity 
Lutheran. Nonetheless, it is one thing to prohibit states through the federal 
Establishment Clause from getting too involved with religious funding or 
sponsorship, but quite another thing altogether to say that such 
incorporation affects state choices to retain more protective rules against 
establishment than the Court has interpreted the federal clause to require. It 
is a basic canon of constitutional law that states can choose to be more 
protective of constitutional rights than the federal Constitution requires.21 
Hence, forcing states, through the federal Free Exercise Clause, to 
effectively adhere to the conservative justices’ vision of what degree of 
church-state separation is desirable as a matter of federal Establishment 
Clause principles stands this canon on its head. 
This brings us to our last potential defense for the Court’s ruling—Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning in his dissent in the related case of Locke v. Davey,22 
which Chief Justice Roberts essentially echoed in his majority opinion in 
Trinity Lutheran. Locke involved a federal Free Exercise Clause challenge 
to a Washington State scholarship program that excluded theology degrees 
from those that grants could be used for due to the state constitution’s 
establishment clause—a provision that, inter alia, barred the use of public 
funds for purposes of religious instruction.23 Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist rejected the challenge, adopting a balancing test that 
weighed the burden the restriction imposed on the plaintiff’s free exercise 
rights against the State’s interests in maintaining its desired degree of 
church-state separation as reflected in its establishment clause. He 
concluded that the “historic and substantial” anti-establishment interests of 
the State outweighed the “relatively minor burden” placed on the plaintiff’s 
free exercise rights.24 
Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous dissent 
arguing that the theology degree exception should have been subjected to 
strict scrutiny, and deemed presumptively unconstitutional, because it 
                                                          
19. The federal Establishment Clause was incorporated by the Court without any analysis in 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
20. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
21. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
22. 540 U.S. 712 (2004); see id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
23. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 715–17 (majority opinion). 
24. See id. at 725. 











singled out religion for a special burden—invoking the Church of Lukumi 
decision to support his argument.25 But Rehnquist rejected Scalia’s 
reasoning, noting that unlike the Lukumi case where a Florida city had 
targeted a religious sect for suppression, in the case before him there was 
no evidence of animus or hostility towards religion that warranted strict 
review—just the State’s historic interest in maintaining its constitutionally-
mandated degree of church-state separation.26   
Despite the Locke Court’s rejection of Scalia’s argument, in Trinity 
Lutheran Chief Justice Roberts essentially adopted it wholesale to 
invalidate Missouri’s denial of the playground resurfacing grant based on 
the state’s establishment clause. He opted to treat that denial as “odious” 
discrimination akin to the sect suppression in Lukumi, warranting the strict 
scrutiny review normally used when illicit government purposes are 
suspected.27 In this way, Roberts avoided the balancing analysis the Court 
utilized in Locke that would have assessed the burden the denial of the 
playground grant placed on the church’s free exercise rights against 
Missouri’s interest in maintaining the degree of church-state separation it 
had historically chosen. In other words, Roberts effectively preordained the 
result against the State by characterizing the grant program’s religious 
exclusion as invidious discrimination rather than a historic decision 
Missouri had made to protect its citizens’ freedom of conscience in religious 
matters.28  
And how did Roberts avoid utilizing the seemingly obvious approach the 
Locke precedent should have dictated? His principal reason was that in 
Locke the denial of the scholarship grant was because the plaintiff planned 
to use it for a religious purpose, whereas in the case before him the church 
was denied the grant solely because of its religious status. To Roberts, this 
appeared to suggest the latter denial was more constitutionally suspect 
because the church was going to use the funds for a secular purpose.29 
However, there are many flaws in this reasoning. For one, Roberts’s 
characterization of the use of the playground grant as being secular in nature 
was essentially wordplay. One could just as easily characterize the use of 
monies to improve the facilities of a conceded religious mission of the 
church as being for a religious purpose. After all, the school, by its own 
                                                          
25. See id. at 726–34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
26. See id. at 720–25 (majority opinion). 
27. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–25 (2017). 
28. Although certain litigants before the Trinity Lutheran Court argued that Missouri’s 
establishment clause was a “mini-Blaine amendment” that was motivated by bias against Catholicism, 
and in particular by concerns about government funds going to Roman Catholic schools, the Court did 
not attribute any such improper purposes to that clause. This treatment seemed appropriate for, among 
other things, the Missouri clause was not what is typically referred to as a Blaine amendment. See infra 
notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 












description, inculcated religious beliefs in its children. For another, even if 
the secular characterization held water, as noted earlier, grants of funds to 
religious institutions for secular uses in turn frees up comparable amounts 
of money for more obvious religious spending. 
Hence, Roberts’s attempt to distinguish Locke, and the balancing 
analysis that even his conservative mentor Chief Justice Rehnquist believed 
was more appropriate when a state’s historic anti-establishment interests 
were at stake, was entirely unconvincing. In short, the Court’s analysis 
seemed designed to reach a result favorable to the church at the expense of 
the consistent application of established principles of constitutional law. 
This Article will elaborate on these themes and proceed in the following 
way. Part I reviews the historical understanding of free exercise rights, and 
anti-establishment provisions that were adopted mainly to buttress those 
rights. It demonstrates how both sets of protections came early on to be 
understood as containing a ban on the use of taxpayer funds to support 
churches and other houses of worship in order to safeguard, among other 
things, the right of individuals not to be coerced into promoting religious 
beliefs they could not in good conscience support. It then discusses how the 
Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran plays somersaults with this history, and 
substantially undermines it despite the conservatives’ frequent defenses of 
using historical understandings to interpret the Constitution in other areas. 
Part II turns to precedent and argues that the Court’s application of its 
earlier decisions in Trinity Lutheran was not faithful to them. Part III then 
argues that despite the seemingly innocuous results in the Trinity Lutheran 
dispute itself, the Court’s decision will have far-reaching and undesirable 
consequences for protecting freedom of religious conscience and a healthy 
separation of church and state in this country. Next, Part IV contends that 
there are compelling historical, legal and normative reasons for treating the 
public funding of religious institutions differently than secular ones. Lastly, 
Part V demonstrates how Trinity Lutheran is the most recent in a trend of 
decisions by the conservative wing of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts to 
lower the church-state wall in a misguided way, one that will only be 
accelerated by the recent appointments of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett 
Kavanaugh to the Court—giving the conservatives a solid five-vote 
majority for years to come.30 
I. TURNING SOMERSAULTS WITH HISTORY 
The story of religious freedom in America is, in substantial part, one of 
the gradual evolution of the right of individuals and communities to, as the 
                                                          
30. See supra note 6 for a discussion of how the newly appointed Justice Kavanaugh is already 
attempting to influence the law in this regard. 











Virginia Constitution of 1776 put it, “the free exercise of religion, according 
to the dictates of conscience.”31 This right came to conspicuously include 
protection against being compelled to fund religious communities that 
promoted beliefs one did not share. 
The story began in colonial America. Pre-independence American 
colonies were ones of remarkable religious diversity (albeit predominantly 
a diversity of Christian sects) that had different approaches to the 
relationship between church and state. As Professor Michael McConnell has 
characterized it, there were four main approaches to that relationship during 
the colonial period.32 Most of the New England colonies, consisting of 
Puritans and other dissenters to the established Church of England, 
instituted a system whereby local congregations were authorized to 
establish religion in accordance with their reading of God’s word.33 A 
central feature of those local establishments was the levying of compulsory 
taxes to support them.34 
The second church-state model was exemplified by the system in 
Virginia, which later spread to several other colonies.35 In Virginia, the 
Church of England was officially established by the Crown and used as an 
“instrument of social control” throughout the state.36 One could say that the 
established religion in Virginia was a “top down” model, while 
establishments in New England were built from the bottom up. But like New 
England, the Virginia churches were supported by compulsory taxes and 
other government-provided benefits.37 Over time, this general model spread 
to Maryland and the southern colonies of North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Georgia.38 
The third model that took hold in New York and New Jersey was 
characterized by religious pluralism and tolerance. Due to the rich amount 
of religious diversity in those colonies, established churches never took hold 
except for a few counties located in metropolitan New York that established 
the Anglican religion but nonetheless practiced wide religious toleration.39 
The last model arose in those colonies that, at least in their beginning stages, 
were founded explicitly as refuges for particular groups of religious 
dissenters—Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, early Maryland, and the 
Carolinas (until these latter colonies later established the Church of England 
                                                          
31. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16. 
32. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (1990). 
33. See id. at 1422. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. at 1424. 
36. See id. at 1423. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. at 1424–25. 












along the lines of Virginia).40 Perhaps not surprisingly for colonies founded 
by dissenters, they practiced the most deliberate and thoughtful toleration 
for various religious groups.41 Indeed, it was in these colonies that free 
exercise of religion was first articulated as a legal principle.42 The core 
element of this principle was that of liberty of religious conscience, or the 
right to believe as one chose without fear of official reprisal. Unsurprisingly, 
these colonies lacked an established religion (until Maryland and the 
Carolinas later trod Virginia’s path).43 Yet it was clear that whether a colony 
had an established religion or not, religion was a central feature of early 
American life. 
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that when colonies became independent 
American states that adopted constitutions following the issuance of the 
Declaration of Independence, virtually all of them contained explicit 
protections for the free exercise of religion.44 The Pennsylvania Constitution 
of 1776, for instance, declared that: 
[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty 
God according to the dictates of their own consciences and 
understanding: And that no man ought or of right can be compelled 
to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of 
worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own 
free will and consent: Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being 
of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, 
on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious 
worship: And that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or 
assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, 
or in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise 
of religious worship.45 
Plainly, Pennsylvania’s understanding of free exercise included, as a key 
component, a bar on compelling an individual to financially support or 
maintain places of worship or ministries against their will. The original 
                                                          
40. See id. at 1424–25. 
41. See id. at 1425. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. at 1424–25. 
44. As McConnell describes: 
Eleven of the thirteen states (plus Vermont) adopted new constitutions between 1776 and 1780. 
Of those eleven, six (plus Vermont) included an explicit bill of rights; three more states adopted 
a bill of rights between 1781 and 1790. With the exception of Connecticut, every state, with or 
without an establishment, had a constitutional provision protecting religious freedom by 1789, 
although two states confined their protections to Christians and five other states confined their 
protections to theists. There was no discernible difference between the free exercise provisions 
adopted by the states with an establishment and those without. 
Id. at 1455 (footnotes omitted).   
45. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II. 











Constitutions of New Jersey and Delaware contained similar bans on such 
compelled support,46 as well as explicit provisions barring those States from 
“establish[ing] . . . any one religious sect . . . in preference to another.”47 
Of course, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware were states that had 
never established religions as colonies. But after independence, even former 
colonies that had established religions began seeing compulsory taxes or 
tithing as a violation of free exercise (and as one component of a broader 
anti-establishment principle).48 North Carolina’s 1776 Constitution, for 
instance, barred compelling a person “to pay, for the purchase of any glebe, 
or the building of any house of worship, or for the maintenance of any 
minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes right.”49 It also prohibited 
“establish[ing] . . . any one religious church or denomination.”50 In its 
Constitution of 1777, New York declared that “the free exercise and 
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or 
preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed.”51 In practical effect, this 
provision both ended compelled taxpayer funding for churches in New York 
and disestablished that State.52 
Virginia’s episode with establishments and compelled funding has 
                                                          
46. Article XVIII of the New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided: 
That no person shall ever, within this Colony, be deprived of the inestimable privilege of 
worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor, 
under any pretence whatever, be compelled to attend any place of worship, contrary to his own 
faith and judgment; nor shall any person, within this Colony, ever be obliged to pay tithes, 
taxes, or any other rates, for the purpose of building or repairing any other church or churches, 
place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what 
he believes to be right, or has deliberately or voluntarily engaged himself to perform.  
N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII (emphasis supplied). Section 2 of the Delaware Declaration of Rights 
of 1776 provided:  
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the 
dictates of their own consciences and understandings; and that no man ought or of right can be 
compelled to attend any religious worship or maintain any ministry contrary to or against his 
own free will and consent, and that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by 
any power whatever that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul the right of 
conscience in the free exercise of religious worship. 
DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2 (emphasis supplied). 
47. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 29; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX.  
48. Laws compelling financial support of religious sects were one possible but important 
component of established religions during the founding period. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, 
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131 (2003) (“Although the laws constituting the establishment were ad hoc and 
unsystematic, they can be summarized in six categories: (1) control over doctrine, governance, and 
personnel of the church; (2) compulsory church attendance; (3) financial support; (4) prohibitions on 
worship in dissenting churches; (5) use of church institutions for public functions; and (6) restriction of 
political participation to members of the established church.”).  
49. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV. 
50. Id.  
51. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII. 
52. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early 












assumed epic dimensions in the American consciousness, mainly because 
of the involvement of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. As noted, 
Virginia’s Constitution of 1776 provided that “all men are equally entitled 
to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience.”53 
While not immediately resulting in disestablishment of the Anglican 
Church, Virginia promptly eliminated tithes to that church for dissenters, 
and shortly thereafter suspended them for all of its citizens.54 
After the Revolutionary War ended, an attempt was made to resurrect 
compulsory taxes for the support of churches of a taxpayer’s choice.55 This 
initiative resulted in the successful efforts of Madison and Jefferson to 
disestablish the State completely in 1785, via Jefferson’s Virginia Statute 
for Religious Freedom.56 In the famous Memorial and Remonstrance that 
Madison wrote as part of these efforts, he opined that even such a liberal 
assessment would violate the rights of free exercise protected by the state 
constitution.57 According to Madison, “the same authority, which can force 
a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property, for the support of 
any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other 
establishment.”58 Thomas Jefferson put the point in even stronger terms in 
the preamble to the Statute for Religious Freedom: “[T]o compel a man to 
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical . . . .”59 
Maryland’s experience was slightly different than that of Virginia, but 
that state reached the same result as to compulsory taxation. Interestingly, 
the Maryland Constitution of 1776 guaranteed Christians “protection in 
their religious liberty,” and against being “compelled to frequent or 
maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any particular place 
of worship, or any particular ministry.”60 However, the latter provision went 
on to say:  
[Y]et the Legislature may, in their discretion, lay a general and equal 
tax for the support of the Christian religion; leaving to each individual 
the power of appointing the payment over of the money, collected 
from him, to the support of any particular place of worship or 
minister, or for the benefit of the poor of his own denomination, or 
the poor in general of any particular county . . . .61  
                                                          
53. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
54. See McConnell, supra note 32, at 1436. 
55. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 36–38 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
56. See id. 
57. See MADISON, infra note 197.  
58. Id. at 7. 
59. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13. 
60. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII. 
61. Id. 











Hence, the Maryland Constitution was a bit conflicted on the question of 
free exercise and compelled taxation, seemingly creating middle ground by 
allowing taxes to go to the support of the poor instead of a church. In any 
event, such a tax was never levied and the State effectively disestablished 
in 1785 when a protracted legislative battle over levying it ended.62 In 1810, 
a formal amendment to the state constitution was added that prohibited 
laying any taxes on “the people of this State, for the support of any 
religion.”63 
South Carolina had a similarly interesting experience with compelled 
taxation. Although its Constitution of 1778 expressly declared that the 
“Christian Protestant religion shall be deemed . . . the established religion 
of this State,” it simultaneously protected “free[] tolerat[ion]” for all who 
believed in God and from having to “pay towards the maintenance and 
support of a religious worship that he does not freely join in.”64 Twelve 
years later, in 1790, the State adopted a new constitution that formally 
disestablished the state by generally guaranteeing the “free exercise . . . of 
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference.”65 
Georgia’s Constitution of 1777 also made a connection between free 
exercise and compulsory taxation, albeit a more limited one than usual. It 
declared that “[a]ll persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their 
religion . . . and shall not, unless by consent, support any teacher or teachers 
except those of their own profession.”66 Hence, that State allowed for 
compulsory taxes to support ministers of one’s own faith, but not those of 
other faiths. However, such taxes were never assessed.67 Moreover, when 
the State adopted a new constitution in 1798, it contained a more standard 
free exercise clause that protected the “privilege of worshipping God in a 
manner agreeable to his own conscience,”68 and protected against being 
obliged “to pay tithes, taxes, or any other rate, for the building or repairing 
any place of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, 
contrary to what he believes to be right.”69 It also declared that “[n]o one 
religious society shall ever be established in this State, in preference to 
another.”70  
                                                          
62. See Esbeck, supra note 52, at 1490. 
63. Id. at 1491 & n.361 (quoting MD. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, 
AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1686, 1705 (Francis 
Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS]). 
64. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII.  
65. See Esbeck, supra note 52, at 1493–94, 1494 n.373 (quoting S.C. CONST. of 1790, reprinted 
in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 63, at 3258, 3264). 
66. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI. 
67. See McConnell, supra note 32, at 1437. 
68. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10.  
69. Id.  












Hence, with the exception of Maryland and Georgia, by the mid-1780s 
all of the middle and southern states had explicitly recognized an individual 
right not to be coerced into financially supporting churches or other places 
of worship against one’s will as part of a broader free exercise right. And 
even Maryland and Georgia did so as a matter of practice, formalizing this 
understanding just a few years later. Moreover, most of the states had also 
buttressed the right of free exercise—either explicitly or in practice—with 
a ban on the establishment of one particular religious denomination by the 
state government. The only states in the original thirteen that had not 
adopted this understanding of free exercise by this time were the New 
England Congregationalist states of Connecticut, New Hampshire, and 
Massachusetts.71  
However, it was not long before even these long-entrenched 
establishments yielded to arguments that compelled support of religious 
congregations violated free exercise rights. Connecticut eliminated such 
support requirements and disestablished in 1818, New Hampshire in 1819, 
and Massachusetts in 1833.72 While Connecticut continued to operate under 
its English charter until adopting a constitution in 1818,73 both the original 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the New Hampshire Constitution 
of 1784 contained explicit protections for the free exercise of religion.74 Yet 
both constitutions also authorized the state legislatures to levy taxes for the 
support of local congregations to promote good governance, subject to an 
individual’s right not to have their taxes used to support any congregation 
but their own.75 Interestingly, both constitutions expressly provided that “no 
subordination of any sect or denomination to another shall ever be 
established by law”76—evidencing an understanding among many New 
Englanders that, even before formal disestablishment, they did not have an 
establishment of religion simply because they provided for the assessment 
of taxes for local congregations.  
In sum, by the time the First Congress met in 1789 to consider a federal 
bill of rights, there appears to have been a widely shared understanding in 
all of the states—except three in New England—that protection against 
having to pay compulsory taxes to support religious faiths a person did not 
believe in was a key component of a broader right to the free exercise of 
religion. And even those New England States recognized a qualified form 
of the right against compelled taxation—limiting the use of such taxes for 
an individual’s own congregation. 
                                                          
71. See McConnell, supra note 32, at 1437. 
72. See Esbeck, supra note 52, at 1458. 
73. See id. at 1510, 1542. 
74. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. II; N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. V. 
75. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. III; N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. VI. 
76. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. III; see also N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. VI. 











This understanding is important to our consideration of the Trinity 
Lutheran decision, because the Court relied on the federal Free Exercise 
Clause in that case to invalidate the application of Missouri’s bar on the use 
of public funds to support religious communities. The ruling was 
particularly notable because the Court’s conservative justices are self-
professed originalists, so this history should matter enormously to them. 
What then did the First Congress, which drafted the Bill of Rights in 1789, 
intend, and, more importantly, what did the people in the various states who 
considered and ratified that document in 1789–91 understand the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment to mean?77  
As has been widely chronicled, the Bill of Rights was added to the 
Constitution at the demand of state ratifying conventions in order to secure 
that charter’s adoption in the face of stiff resistance.78 The states wanted to 
make sure the new national government being created kept within the limits 
of the powers being granted to it. In the First Congress, the task of drafting 
a bill of rights fell to the newly elected House member from Virginia, James 
Madison, who had just four years earlier helped Jefferson push through the 
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and its ban on compulsory taxation 
to fund religious causes.79 As Madison put pen to paper, he most likely had 
copies of the various state constitutions to work from, as well as a list of 
requested amendments from the state ratifying conventions—many of 
which were based on the states’ own bills of rights. This is important to the 
original understanding of the Religion Clauses, since as McConnell has 
observed, the “state constitutions provide the most direct evidence of the 
original understanding, for it is reasonable to infer that those who drafted 
and adopted the first amendment assumed the term ‘free exercise of 
religion’ meant what it had meant in their states.”80 
After Madison completed his draft bill of rights, its provisions went 
through various revisions by committees in the House of Representatives 
and Senate with scant discussion or debate.81 That is not surprising since 
those congressmen were preoccupied with the business of getting the new 
federal government up and running, and a bill of rights was primarily seen 
as a way to appease those states that were still agitating for a new 
                                                          
77. It is beyond the scope of this Article to wade into the voluminous debate over proper modes 
of originalist interpretation. Suffice it to say that we believe the understanding of those who voted to 
ratify the Bill of Rights and bring those provisions into law is key to what those provisions were intended 
to mean. 
78. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12 (1999). 
79. See id.; supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
80. McConnell, supra note 32, at 1456. 
81. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 
1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 854 (1994) (“Given the importance of the Bill of Rights today, 
there was surprisingly little recorded debate on its provisions; but it should be recalled that the First 












constitutional convention to address perceived defects in the Constitution.82 
Hence, all the more reason to read that document in light of how similar 
provisions in the state constitutions were understood. When the drafting 
process was complete, the document was sent to the states in September of 
1789 and ratified by the required eleven states in December of 1791.83 
And so what is the most persuasive case for what the founding generation 
understood the phrase “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” to mean? 
Considering the Free Exercise Clause first, it seems clear it was understood 
to prohibit the federal government from placing any burdens on a person as 
a consequence of his or her religious beliefs—a right that comprised the 
core of the similarly worded free exercise rights, or comparable liberty of 
conscience rights, protected by every one of the states that had a formal 
constitution in 1789. But was the federal clause also understood to prohibit 
compelled taxpayer funding of churches and other places of worship? This 
question is more difficult. 
While the foregoing discussion demonstrates that most of the existing 
states would have so understood it, at least the people of Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire likely would not have shared that 
understanding—except, perhaps, in the limited sense reflected in the 
constitutions of the latter two states.84 In addition, in 1791, Vermont, which 
generally followed the New England Congregationalist model until 1807, 
was admitted to the union as a state and was one of the eleven states that 
ratified the Bill of Rights.85 So its people would likely have shared the same 
understanding of free exercise as the other New England states. 
Interestingly, however, Connecticut and Massachusetts did not ratify the 
Bill of Rights until the twentieth century,86 and so arguably the 
understanding of their citizens would not be relevant to the original 
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. But even if so, New Hampshire 
and Vermont would still stand in the way of finding a uniformly shared 
understanding on this issue. 
Nonetheless, what the early history of free exercise shows is that at the 
time the Free Exercise Clause was adopted, most states did understand it to 
preclude such compelled funding, and the few holdout Congregationalist 
states came around to that understanding in a relatively short period of time 
thereafter. Moreover, it is significant that of the twenty-two new states 
admitted to the Union between 1792 and the arguable application of federal 
                                                          
82. See id. 
83. See LEVY, supra note 78, at 40, 43. 
84. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
85. See LEVY, supra note 78, at 101. 
86. See id. at 41. 











free exercise rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, 
fifteen, including Missouri, had a free exercise clause in their founding 
constitutions that virtually tracked the language in those of most of the 
original states barring compulsory taxation for the support of churches or 
other houses of worship.87 Moreover, six of the other state constitutions had 
more abbreviated free exercise clauses along the lines of New York’s 
original constitution that were likely understood to bar such compelled 
funding.88 Hence, even if the original Free Exercise Clause did not yet fully 
encompass a ban on compulsory taxation for places of worship as a core 
component of that right, it seems clear that by the time the Fourteenth 
                                                          
87. KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 3 (“That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can of right be 
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his 
consent . . . .”); TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 3 (substantially same); OHIO CONST. of 1803, art. VIII, 
§ 3 (substantially same); IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 3 (substantially same); ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. 
VIII, § 3 (same); ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 3 (“No person within this state shall, upon, any pretence, 
be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping God in the manner most agreeable to his own 
conscience; nor be compelled to attend any place of worship, nor shall any one ever be obliged to pay 
any tythes, taxes, or other rate, for the building or repairing any place of worship, or for the maintenance 
of any minister or ministry.”); MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 4 (“That all men have a natural and 
indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no 
man can be compelled to erect, support, or attend any place of worship, or to maintain any minister of 
the gospel, or teacher of religion . . . .”); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 3 (same as Kentucky 
Constitution); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 4 (“Every person has a right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience; and no person can of right be compelled to attend, erect, 
or support, against his will, any place of religious worship, or pay any tithes, taxes or other rates, for the 
support of any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion.”); TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 4 
(substantially same as Kentucky Constitution); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 3 (substantially same as 
Michigan Constitution in pertinent respects); WIS. CONST. of 1848, art I., § 18 (substantially same as 
Kentucky Constitution); MINN. CONST. of 1858, art. I, § 16 (substantially same as Kentucky 
Constitution); KAN. CONST. of 1861, Bill of Rights, § 7 (“The right to worship God according to the 
dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend or support 
any form of worship . . . .”); W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. II, § 9 (“No man shall be compelled to frequent 
or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever . . . .”). 
88. MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 3 (“The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and 
worship, without discrimination, shall forever be free to all persons in this State . . . .”); ME. CONST. of 
1819, art. I, § 3 (“All men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to 
the dictates of their own consciences . . . and all religious societies in this State . . . shall at all times have 
the exclusive right of electing their public teachers, and contracting with them for their support and 
maintenance.”); FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. 1, § 3 (“That all men have a natural and inalienable right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience; and that no preference shall 
ever be given by law, to any religious establishment, or mode of worship in this State.”); CAL. CONST. 
of 1849, art. 1, § 4 (substantially same as Mississippi Constitution); OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, §§ 2–3 
(“All men shall be secure in the natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their 
own consciences. . . . No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of 
religeous opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.”); NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 4 
(substantially same as Mississippi Constitution). It should be noted that the twenty-second state 
admitted during this period, Louisiana, did not adopt a bill of rights until 1868. John Devlin, Louisiana 
Associated General Contractors: A Case Study in the Failure of a State Equality Guarantee to Further 
the Transformative Vision of Civil Rights, 63 LA. L. REV. 887, 894 (2003) (“In contrast, the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1868, enacted at the flood tide of radical reconstruction did, for the first time, feature a 












Amendment was adopted the American people so understood it to include 
such a ban. 
The foregoing historical discussion also demonstrates that the original 
states gradually added anti-establishment clauses barring governmental 
preferences for a particular religious sect or denomination to fortify free 
exercise rights that all agreed were at the heart of religious freedom, whether 
they initially had established religions or not.89 But since most of those 
clauses used wording to the effect that their respective state governments 
were prohibited “from establishing a religious sect in preference to others,” 
why then did the federal Establishment Clause use the peculiar wording 
barring Congress from making any laws “respecting an establishment of 
religion”? Although there has been a vigorous debate about this, the weight 
of scholarly commentary appears to support the position that this wording 
was designed to accomplish two purposes.90 First, it made it clear that the 
new federal government would have no power to interfere with the wide 
variety of decisions states were making as to the degree of church-state 
separation to maintain within their own borders. In other words, it was a 
federalism provision that ensured complete state autonomy over these 
matters. Second, and perhaps more obviously, it was understood to do at the 
federal level of government what the state clauses did at theirs—keep that 
government from preferring one religious sect to others, and particularly 
from making one the official church or religion of the new nation. 
One principal debate about the latter purpose is whether it also 
encompassed a ban on federal non-preferential financial assistance for 
religion, similar perhaps to the general assessment schemes of the New 
England Congregationalist states.91 Without wading too far into this 
discussion, given the differences among the states that ratified the Bill of 
Rights on compulsory support—with most barring it as a matter of free 
exercise and only New Hampshire and Vermont finding it permissible at 
                                                          
89. See McConnell, supra note 32, at 1455 (“With the exception of Connecticut, every state, with 
or without an establishment, had a constitutional provision protecting religious freedom by 1789, 
although two states confined their protections to Christians and five other states confined their 
protections to theists. There was no discernible difference between the free exercise provisions adopted 
by the states with an establishment and those without.”) (citation omitted); see also Trinity Lutheran 
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2041 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment contain a promise from our government and a backstop that 
disables our government from breaking it. The Free Exercise Clause extends the promise. We each retain 
our inalienable right to ‘the free exercise’ of religion, to choose for ourselves whether to believe and 
how to worship. And the Establishment Clause erects the backstop. Government cannot, through the 
enactment of a ‘law respecting an establishment of religion,’ start us down the path to the past, when 
this right was routinely abridged.”). 
90. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32 (1998); Kurt T. Lash, The Second 
Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1085, 1091 (1995); Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings 
of the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 511 (2006). 
91. See, e.g., DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 249–58 (2010). 











that time—the argument for the permissibility of non-preferentialist aid 
seems implausible. And the gradual crystallization of that free exercise 
understanding amongst most states by the time the Fourteenth Amendment 
was adopted—including those of New England and newly admitted ones—
seems to make such a non-preferentialist understanding unlikely at the time 
some commentators argue the Establishment Clause may very well have 
been applied to the states.92 
This conclusion is buttressed by a growing separation of church and state 
at the state level between 1830 and 1868 even beyond the wide adoption of 
a free exercise bar on compelled support for devotional communities. When 
Michigan became a state, its original 1835 Constitution not only contained 
a free exercise bar on compulsory support, but also the following provision: 
“No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious 
societies, or theological or religious seminaries.”93 By the 1860s, several other 
states had adopted similar restrictions on state funding in their 
constitutions—Wisconsin in 1848, Indiana and Ohio in 1851, Minnesota in 
1857, Oregon in 1857, and Kansas in 1858.94 While it is not exactly clear 
what these clauses were designed to achieve, at least one leading scholar 
has argued they were mainly intended to prevent public funds from flowing 
to private religious schools that included religious indoctrination in their 
curricula—all as part of a broader separation of church and state trend that 
was emerging throughout the nineteenth century.95 
Indeed, after the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption in 1868, this trend 
only accelerated. The very no-funding provision in Missouri’s constitution 
that was at issue in Trinity Lutheran—adopted in October 1875 when that 
                                                          
92. See generally, e.g., Lash, supra note 90 (arguing that to the extent the adopters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended to apply the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the states, the 
Establishment Clause would have been included amongst them). Of course, as with many issues of 
constitutional interpretation, ascertaining historical understandings with any level of precision on 
religious funding is nearly impossible. Moreover, governmental actions are not always consistent with 
constitutional understandings even where they can be said to exist. For instance, as various 
commentators have pointed out, Congress occasionally directed financial aid to religious causes even in 
decidedly preferential ways. See, e.g., DRAKEMAN, supra note 91, at 305–14 (describing congressional 
funding of efforts from the founding through the nineteenth century to convert native American Indians 
to Christianity).  
93. MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 5. 
94. See Steven K. Green, The “Second Disestablishment”: The Evolution of Nineteenth-Century 
Understandings of Separation of Church and State, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION 280, 288 (T. 
Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2012). 
95. See id. at 288–302. While some commentators have attributed such clauses to emerging anti-
Catholic bigotry by Protestants, Green has argued that such arguments are overblown and it is more 
accurate to view them as part of an evolving trend towards a greater separation of church and state that 
was occurring during the nineteenth century. See id. at 293–302; see also STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, 
THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2012); John Witte, Jr., Facts and Fictions About the History of 
Separation of Church and State, 48 J. CHURCH & ST. 15, 16, 38–40 (2006) (arguing that while state no-
funding provisions were likely motivated in part by anti-Catholic bias, they were also driven by broader, 












state replaced its entire constitution—was plainly drawn from these earlier 
provisions of other state constitutions.96 And as Justice Sotomayor 
chronicled in her Trinity Lutheran dissent, today thirty-eight of the fifty 
states have some form of counterpart to the 1875 Missouri provision—most 
of which were first adopted in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.97 
Thus, to describe, as Chief Justice Roberts did in the Trinity Lutheran 
majority opinion, Missouri’s historic and widely shared anti-establishment 
interests in applying its no-funding provision as a mere “policy preference 
for skating as far as possible from religious establishment concerns,”98 
                                                          
96. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 7 (“That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, 
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, 
preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such . . . .”). For instance, Missouri’s provision is little different 
in substance from that contained in Article I, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution of 1851. IND. CONST. 
of 1851, art. I, § 6 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or 
theological institution.”). As Green notes, a “common practice in later state constitution drafting was for 
delegates to borrow language from the constitutions of other states.” Green, supra note 94, at 287. 
97. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2037 & n.10–11 
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Of the state provisions cited by Sotomayor, approximately twenty 
were of the general no-funding variety similar to Missouri’s Section 7, while the remaining ones were 
more along the lines of the traditional “no compulsory support” provisions found in the early 
constitutions.  
98. Id. at 2024. As in Locke, the Trinity Lutheran plaintiff and several amici attempted to argue 
that Article I, Section 7 was a Blaine-type amendment motivated by anti-Catholic bias, and should have 
been invalidated on that basis. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 723 n.7 (2004); Brief for Petitioner at 
42–44, Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 15-577); see also, e.g., Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 15-577). At least one prominent 
commentator appears to have agreed with this claim. See Douglas Laycock, Comment, Churches, 
Playgrounds, Government Dollars—and Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 168 (2017). However, the 
fact that the Court did not address this argument perhaps indicates it reached the same conclusion it did 
in Locke—that the provision at issue in this case was not a Blaine amendment, and there was no “credible 
connection” between Section 7 and a true Blaine-type provision contained in Article IX, Section 8 of 
the Missouri Constitution. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7. And that indeed appears to be the case here. 
Section 7 did not focus on denying public schools like Article IX, Section 8 did. Moreover, the latter 
provision was added to the Missouri Constitution five years before Section 7 as the result of a 
controversy about public aid to Catholic schools. See Laycock, supra note 98, at 167. As Laycock noted, 
there was nothing in the legislative record of Section 7 linking it to that dispute. Id. at 168. Nonetheless, 
Laycock argues that the “timing and language of [Section 7] suggests that it was part and parcel of the 
movement for Blaine provisions.” Id. We have contended, however, that Section 7 can just as readily be 
viewed as part of a broader trend occurring in the nineteenth century to achieve a greater separation of 
church and state. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. After all, even if the broader no-funding 
provisions such as Section 7 were partially motivated by a concern that public aid received by Catholic 
or other religious schools would be used to support sectarian instruction in specific faiths, that does not 
necessarily amount to illegitimate bias. It could just as readily be characterized as a legitimate concern 
about public dollars being used to promote a particular version of religious truth. Nonetheless, an 
extensive analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article—particularly since the Trinity 
Lutheran Court did not question the bona fides of Section 7 despite discounting Missouri’s church-state 
separation interests as applied to the specific facts of the case. But it is worth noting that even if Section 
7 bore a Blaine-type taint, there is a strong argument it was cleansed when the people of Missouri 
readopted the provision in 1945 as part of an overhaul of its constitution. As one student author who 
studied the circumstances under which Missouri adopted its actual Blaine-type provision in Article IX, 
Section 8 concluded,  
[e]ven if one assumes Missouri’s 1875 Blaine Amendment was the bona fide product of anti-
Catholic bigotry . . . [a]ny taint of anti-Catholic sentiment . . . was purged by the 1945 











belittled and vastly understated the weighty interests at stake. Just as 
troubling (and one could say perverse) was his reliance on the federal Free 
Exercise Clause—a provision which, as demonstrated, early on came to be 
widely understood as barring compelled taxpayer funding of religious 
societies—to trump Missouri’s anti-establishment interests. 
In sum, even if one takes the position that the federal Establishment 
Clause has been properly incorporated against the states, there seems to be 
little historical support for the notion that the provision of non-preferential 
financial assistance to churches or other worship institutions is consistent 
with that clause. Hence, as Sotomayor argued, the Chief Justice’s similar 
dismissal of the notion in Trinity Lutheran that the provision of such aid to 
the church violated the federal Establishment Clause99 seems ahistoric as 
well.100  
Moreover if, as Justice Clarence Thomas and many conservatives have 
argued,101 it would have been illogical for the Fourteenth Amendment to 
have incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states due to its 
purpose of barring any federal interference with church-state decisions by 
the states, the Trinity Lutheran decision becomes even more troubling. Now 
the entire purpose of both Religion Clauses has been inverted—the federal 
Free Exercise Clause being used to invalidate an application of a state anti-
establishment clause that the federal Establishment Clause was designed to 
protect. There is more than a little irony in the Court using a federal free 
exercise clause historically understood to protect against compulsory 
taxpayer funding of churches to invalidate a state constitutional provision 
designed to protect the same interests, even while purportedly being 
                                                          
constitution. By 1945, any anti-Catholic hysteria existing in [Missouri] had largely dissipated, 
and the amendment was passed for entirely benevolent reasons, without a shred of historical 
evidence of illicit anti-Catholic motive. 
Aaron E. Schwartz, Comment, Dusting off the Blaine Amendment: Two Challenges to Missouri’s Anti-
Establishment Tradition, 72 MO. L. REV. 339, 376–77 (2007) (footnotes omitted).  
One might also attempt to justify the Court’s dismissive treatment of Missouri’s anti-establishment 
interests in the case by noting that, some two months before that tribunal issued its decision, a recently-
elected Republican governor of the state instructed Missouri’s Department of Natural Resources to allow 
religious organizations to be eligible for the sort of grant the Trinity Lutheran Church was denied.  See 
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101. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“Quite simply, the Establishment Clause is best understood as a federalism provision—it 












shielded against federal interference by the Establishment Clause. 
And to make matters worse, the no-funding principle contained in the 
federal and state constitutions was theoretically designed to shield 
dissenting taxpayers against democratic majorities who, through their 
legislatures, might be tempted to violate it. But in Trinity Lutheran, it was 
the Court that decided dissenting taxpayers in Missouri, regardless of 
whether they might have constituted a majority or minority of the state, 
would be required by the federal Constitution to suffer public funds going 
directly to the church in that case. 
All of this makes one wonder. What happened to the normal position of 
the conservative justices that comprised most of the Trinity Lutheran 
majority that the judiciary should exercise restraint in the face of ambiguous 
questions of constitutional interpretation?102 And what happened to their 
usual federalism position that such restraint should especially be exercised 
in the face of countervailing state interests of a historic magnitude?103 And 
where was Justice Thomas with his normal Establishment Clause anti-
incorporation, state rights arguments,104 or indeed all of the conservative 
justices when it comes to originalist modes of interpretation?105 
Both the Chief Justice’s opinion and Justice Thomas’ concurrence lacked 
even an iota of historical analysis, with Justice Thomas going further and 
joining the freshman Justice Gorsuch’s seriously ahistoric concurrence 
expressing the view that the public funds received by the church could be 
constitutionally used for religious purposes (such as to fund worship 
services).106 Not only did this opinion display a surprising disregard of free 
exercise history for a justice that has frequently declared himself to be a 
“text and history” judge, but the disrespect for Missouri’s anti-establishment 
interests inherent in Justice Gorsuch’s position is striking.107 
Perhaps the Trinity Lutheran majority should have been reminded that 
the history of free exercise in this country has predominantly been one of 
protecting against the government directly forcing people to act contrary to 
their religious beliefs, such as by forcing citizens to underwrite the religious 
devotions of others. It decidedly has not been about allowing devotional 
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his view that government funding may be put to religious uses. 











communities to receive public funding on the theory that otherwise their 
free exercise rights would be indirectly burdened (much less invidiously 
discriminated against as Justice Roberts would have it). Government 
funding of religious groups is a zero-sum situation from a free exercise 
perspective—if the government is allowed to provide funds, the rights of 
dissenting taxpayers are directly infringed; if such funding is barred, 
arguably the free exercise rights of devotional communities are indirectly 
burdened. The American history of free exercise provides a clear answer as 
to who should triumph in this contest. 
There is no doubt that when the Court inserted itself into church-state 
issues in Everson after they had been worked out at the colony and state 
levels for over 300 years, it departed from this historic understanding of free 
exercise rights. By myopically viewing the issue in that case of taxpayer 
monies being directed to parents of public and Catholic schoolchildren as 
an Establishment Clause issue, the Court lost sight of the free exercise 
interests at stake. Indeed, to the extent the majority even acknowledged that 
free exercise rights were in play, it focused exclusively on those of the 
Catholic parents who could be burdened by being denied bus fare 
reimbursements—and said nothing about those of the dissenting plaintiff 
taxpayers.108 Moreover, the Court established a neutrality principle—that 
government must neither aid nor hinder religion—to balance the competing 
interests of the government and religious aid recipients in the case, striking 
the balance in favor of the latter.109 It reasoned that the bus reimbursements 
were for a secular purpose, went to the Catholic parents rather than the 
parochial schools directly, and only indirectly benefited the latter 
institutions.110  
In the modern era, then, the battle over government aid to religion has 
been waged almost exclusively on the Establishment Clause front—and 
mainly how to apply the Everson neutrality principle in a particular case. 
Since this principle in theory purports to restrict the government from 
providing non-preferential aid to religious organizations, the more 
conservative Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have manipulated it over time 
to permit greater amounts of such aid.111 This trend is what enabled Chief 
Justice Roberts to casually assert in Trinity Lutheran that providing a public 
grant directly to a church for the purportedly secular purpose of resurfacing 
a playground would not be a federal Establishment Clause problem.112  
In viewing religious aid cases this way, however, the Court inverted 
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years of American history where rights of conscience were the primary 
driver against compelled funding—and anti-establishment clauses an 
undergirding support. But even taking the modern Court’s ahistorical 
approach at face value, the Trinity Lutheran majority’s use of the federal 
Free Exercise Clause to override Missouri’s anti-establishment clause was 
indefensible. It is a basic canon of constitutional law that states, under their 
laws, may be more protective of constitutional rights guaranteed by the 
federal Constitution.113 And so even if the Court were correct to read the 
federal Establishment Clause as permitting direct non-preferential aid to 
churches in certain circumstances, this does not invalidate Missouri’s choice 
to maintain greater protection for anti-establishment rights than exists at the 
federal level. For the conservative justices who routinely inveigh against 
federal encroachment on state rights, the Trinity Lutheran decision stands 
as a stark example of the oft-asserted criticism that federalism principles 
only seem important when they are convenient to the result in a particular 
case.  
In sum, this Part I has argued that the Trinity Lutheran decision was 
contrary to free exercise and anti-establishment values that are deeply 
embedded in American constitutional history. In Part II, we will 
demonstrate that the decision is also indefensible as a matter of the Court’s 
own precedent.  
II. ABANDONING PRECEDENT 
At the outset of her powerful Trinity Lutheran dissent, Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor declared: “This case is about nothing less than the relationship 
between religious institutions and the civil government—that is, between 
church and state. The Court today profoundly changes that relationship by 
holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires the government to 
provide public funds directly to a church.”114 Never before in all of 
American history had the Supreme Court held the government was required 
to provide financial aid to a religious institution. Usually cases coming to 
the Court concerning government aid and the Establishment Clause have 
involved whether particular assistance is unconstitutional.115 Even when 
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finding that a particular form of assistance was permissible,116 never did the 
Court suggest that it might be constitutionally required. That is what makes 
Trinity Lutheran so important. 
In this section we argue that the Court could come to this conclusion only 
by disregarding precedent. Specifically, we argue that the Court’s decision 
is inconsistent with its earlier ruling in Locke v. Davey,117 and that the 
Court’s holding adopts a position rejected by a majority of the justices in 
Mitchell v. Helms.118 Of course, the fact that the Court is significantly 
departing from precedent does not, by itself, show that the ruling is 
undesirable. Precedent, at times, should be overruled. But understanding 
how Trinity Lutheran abandons precedent is important in recognizing its 
significance and helps to illuminate the broad implications of the decision. 
A. The Specious Distinctions of Locke v. Davey 
Locke v. Davey was the previous case where the Court had to consider 
whether the government was constitutionally required to provide aid to 
support religion. The Court, 7–2, rejected such a requirement. Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, obviously no liberal, wrote the opinion for the Court; 
only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. 
Locke arose from Washington’s program of giving scholarships to 
students who qualify academically and financially and who attend college 
in the state.119 Students can attend any public or private college, including a 
religiously affiliated college, and may study whatever they choose.120 But 
there is one limit: students must not be pursuing a degree that is 
“devotional;” that is, the student cannot use the scholarship to study for 
training to become a minister.121 Washington justified this restriction based 
on a provision in its state constitution which provides that “[n]o public 
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious 
establishment.”122 
Joshua Davey, a recipient of a Promise Scholarship, chose to attend 
Northwest College, a private Christian college affiliated with the 
Assemblies of God denomination.123 Davey sought to become a minister 
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and had a double major in pastoral ministries and business 
management/administration.124 When Davey was informed that he could not 
receive the Promise Scholarship if he pursued training to become a minister, 
he refused the aid and filed a lawsuit challenging the restriction.125 Davey 
argued that Washington violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment by allowing students to receive scholarship assistance if they 
pursued secular, but not religious, studies.126 
The Court rejected that contention and ruled in favor of the State of 
Washington.127 At the outset, the Court emphasized that Washington could, 
if it wanted, allow its scholarships to be used by students studying to be 
clergy members.128 In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the 
Blind,129 the Supreme Court had unanimously ruled that it did not violate 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment for the government to 
permit students receiving scholarship assistance to study for the ministry. 
The Court said that “there is room for play in the joints” between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.130 The Court explained, 
“[T]here are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but 
not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”131 
The Court reasoned that denying Davey scholarship money to study to 
be a minister does not interfere with his free exercise of religion in any 
way.132 He still can receive training to be a pastor, just without it being 
subsidized by the government.133 The Court stressed that many states 
historically have sought to limit use of their taxpayers’ money to subsidize 
religious institutions.134 
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justice Thomas, argued that the 
denial of aid to Davey constituted hostility to religion that violated the Free 
Exercise Clause.135 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded his majority opinion 
by responding to and rejecting this argument: 
 In short, we find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11, of 
the Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise 
Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus toward 
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religion. Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we 
therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational 
religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect.  
 Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey’s claim must 
fail. The State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional 
degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a 
relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If any room exists 
between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here.136 
Locke means that government at all levels can choose how it wants to 
spend taxpayers’ money and the extent, if any, it wants to financially 
support religion. The Court recognized that the case posed an issue where 
there is some tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause, but it concluded that it is a choice to be made by the 
political process and not the courts. 
Under Locke, it should have been permissible for Missouri to make the 
choice to subsidize secular private schools, but not religious ones. 
Missouri’s decision, like Washington’s, was to deny aid that could have 
been given without violating the Establishment Clause. The Court 
distinguished Locke v. Davey on two grounds.  
First, the Court said:  
Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; he was 
denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use the 
funds to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no question that 
Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it is—a 
church.137  
Second, the Court said that Locke involved aid for training a minister, 
whereas this case concerns assistance for playgrounds. Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote:  
The Court in Locke also stated that Washington’s choice was in 
keeping with the State’s antiestablishment interest in not using 
taxpayer funds to pay for the training of clergy; in fact, the Court 
could “think of few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment 
interests come more into play.” . . . Here nothing of the sort can be 
said about a program to use recycled tires to resurface playgrounds.138 
Both of these distinctions are very troubling and unpersuasive. As to the 
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former, any time the government denies aid to parochial schools it is 
because of what they are: religious institutions. This would seem to make 
any denial of aid to religious schools unconstitutional when assistance is 
provided to secular private schools. Or for that matter, it would make it 
unconstitutional to deny religious institutions any aid that is provided to 
secular institutions. Chief Justice Roberts’s distinction thus has dramatic 
implications: the government never would be able to deny financial 
assistance to religious institutions that is provided to secular ones.  
For years, the government refused to provide faith-based institutions the 
assistance offered to secular institutions, whether for preschools or drug 
rehabilitation programs or other social services. Religious institutions could 
receive the aid, but they needed to create a secular arm to do so. The 
charitable choice movement has sought to allow faith-based institutions—
churches, synagogues, mosques—to directly receive government 
assistance. There long has been debate over whether charitable choice is 
desirable and constitutional.139 
The language in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion suggests that charitable 
choice may be a constitutional requirement. After all, the denial of aid 
always is because of what the institutions are: churches, synagogues, 
mosques.  
Also, the distinction between what an institution is and what it does is 
inherently arbitrary. Religious institutions are different precisely because of 
what they do. Conversely, Joshua Davey was denied use of his scholarship 
because of what he was: a Christian who wanted to be ordained as a 
minister. 
The Court’s other distinction based on how the aid is used is equally 
troubling. As the Court often has observed, dollars are fungible. Aid 
provided for playgrounds frees up money for the parochial school to use for 
other purposes, including religious indoctrination. As Justice Sotomayor 
noted in her dissent: 
 The government may not directly fund religious exercise. Put in 
doctrinal terms, such funding violates the Establishment Clause 
because it impermissibly “advanc[es] . . . religion.”  
 Nowhere is this rule more clearly implicated than when funds 
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flow directly from the public treasury to a house of worship. A house 
of worship exists to foster and further religious exercise. . . . When a 
government funds a house of worship, it underwrites this religious 
exercise.140  
Justice Sotomayor stressed that this is exactly the choice of the State of 
Washington in Locke v. Davey and of Missouri in denying religious schools 
aid for playgrounds:  
Missouri has recognized the simple truth that, even absent an 
Establishment Clause violation, the transfer of public funds to houses 
of worship raises concerns that sit exactly between the Religion 
Clauses. To avoid those concerns, and only those concerns, it has 
prohibited such funding. In doing so, it made the same choice made 
by the earliest States centuries ago and many other States in the years 
since. The Constitution permits this choice.141 
In other words, Chief Justice Roberts’s attempts to distinguish Locke v. 
Davey are unpersuasive and have broad implications. Ultimately the 
question in both cases was whether the government is constitutionally 
required to provide aid for religious instruction when it provides it for 
secular instruction. Locke says no; Trinity Lutheran says yes. 
B. Returning to the Approach Rejected in Mitchell v. Helms 
Actually, there is a prior Supreme Court opinion that took the approach 
that the government is constitutionally obligated to provide aid for religious 
institutions: Justice Clarence Thomas’s plurality opinion in Mitchell v. 
Helms.142 But that approach was explicitly rejected by a majority of the 
Court. Now, the Court in Trinity Lutheran seems to be embracing it. 
Mitchell involved Louisiana providing instructional equipment to 
parochial schools. The issue was whether this violated the Establishment 
Clause. Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality of four, said that the aid 
should be allowed because it is provided equally to all schools, religious and 
nonreligious.143 He said that the key question is whether the government 
was participating in religious indoctrination. He wrote:  
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the 
State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the 
principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range 
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of groups or persons without regard to their religion. If the religious, 
irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, 
no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular 
recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government.144  
He rejected the argument that aid is impermissible because it might be 
diverted to religious use because any assistance could free funds that end up 
being used for religious purposes.145 
Justice Thomas emphatically rebuffed the view that the government 
cannot give aid that is actually used for religious education. He also sharply 
criticized the traditional law preventing the government from giving aid to 
“pervasively sectarian” institutions. He said that this phrase was born of 
anti-Catholic bigotry and wrote that “hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian 
schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow.”146 He 
declared: “[T]he inquiry into the recipient’s religious views required by a 
focus on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only unnecessary 
but also offensive. It is well established, in numerous other contexts, that 
courts should refrain from trolling through a person’s or institution’s 
religious beliefs.”147 He argued that provisions in state constitutions 
forbidding aid to religious institutions—such as that in Missouri’s—were 
the product of anti-Catholic sentiments and should not be allowed to prevent 
aid today. He wrote: “In short, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires 
the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible 
aid programs, and other doctrines of this Court bar it. This doctrine, born of 
bigotry, should be buried now.”148 
If followed, Justice Thomas’s approach would require the government to 
give aid to parochial schools any time it is assisting secular private schools. 
But his opinion was joined only by three other justices: Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Four justices explicitly rejected 
Justice Thomas’s view of the First Amendment’s religion clauses. 
Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined 
by Justice Breyer, in which she sharply disagreed with Justice Thomas’s 
approach. Justice O’Connor said that equality never had been the sole 
measure of whether a government action violated the Establishment Clause. 
She wrote: “[W]e have never held that a government-aid program passes 
constitutional muster solely because of the neutral criteria it employs as a 
basis for distributing aid.”149 She continued, “I also disagree with the 
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plurality’s conclusion that actual diversion of government aid to religious 
indoctrination is consistent with the Establishment Clause.”150 Justice 
O’Connor said that the test should be whether aid actually is used for 
religious instruction, in which case the Establishment Clause is violated.151 
Because she found no indication here that the aid was used for religious 
education in more than a negligible way, she found that the Louisiana 
program did not violate the First Amendment.152 
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg, urged the Court to adhere to its precedents and find that aid is 
impermissible when it is of a type, like instructional materials, that can be 
used for religious education.153 Justice Souter strongly disagreed with the 
plurality’s view that equality is the sole test for the Establishment Clause 
and identified a number of factors that prior cases require to be considered 
in determining whether aid is impermissible.154 Justice Souter powerfully 
concluded his dissent by stating: “[I]n rejecting the principle of no aid to a 
school’s religious mission the plurality is attacking the most fundamental 
assumption underlying the Establishment Clause, that government can in 
fact operate with neutrality in its relation to religion. I believe that it can, 
and so respectfully dissent.”155 Justice Souter forcefully explained why 
government aid to religious institutions should be deemed to violate the 
Establishment Clause: 
 The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause prohibits Congress 
(and, by incorporation, the States) from making any law respecting 
an establishment of religion. It has been held to prohibit not only the 
institution of an official church, but any government act favoring 
religion, a particular religion, or for that matter irreligion. Thus, it 
bars the use of public funds for religious aid.  
 The establishment prohibition of government religious funding 
serves more than one end. It is meant to guarantee the right of 
individual conscience against compulsion, to protect the integrity of 
religion against the corrosion of secular support, and to preserve the 
unity of political society against the implied exclusion of the less 
favored and the antagonism of controversy over public support for 
religious causes.156 
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Justice Thomas and three other justices would have found that the denial 
of aid to religious schools violates the First Amendment when the same 
assistance is provided to secular private schools. Five justices could not 
have been more explicit in rejecting this view. But it is exactly the approach 
of the Trinity Lutheran majority. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
As suggested in Part II, the implications of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
approach are stunning: seemingly Trinity Lutheran means that the 
government must provide aid to religious institutions when it is giving 
assistance to secular ones. To address this, the majority opinion includes a 
footnote limiting its impact. In footnote 3, the Court says: “This case 
involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to 
playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or 
other forms of discrimination.”157 Only four justices joined this footnote; 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined the majority opinion except for this 
footnote. Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the 
judgment, stressing that this case is just about aid for playgrounds: “Public 
benefits come in many shapes and sizes. I would leave the application of the 
Free Exercise Clause to other kinds of public benefits for another day.”158 
The central question after Trinity Lutheran is how far the Court will go 
in holding that the government is constitutionally required to provide the 
same aid to religious institutions that it gives to secular private institutions. 
At the very least, Trinity Lutheran is an invitation for religious institutions 
to bring challenges any time they are denied a benefit given to secular 
institutions. Courts will need to struggle with whether a particular type of 
aid is more like that in Locke v. Davey, which the government can choose 
to deny to religious uses, or more like Trinity Lutheran, where the denial of 
aid is unconstitutional. As explained in the prior section, this line is totally 
unclear and one that will be much litigated.159 
Although we would like to see Trinity Lutheran limited to aid to 
playgrounds, that seems quite unlikely. First, the majority repeatedly says 
that “strict scrutiny” is to be used when the government denies aid to 
parochial schools that it provides to secular private schools. The Court 
explained that government discrimination against religious institutions must 
meet strict scrutiny. Chief Justice Roberts stated: “The Free Exercise Clause 
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‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment’ and subjects to 
the strictest scrutiny laws that target the religious for ‘special disabilities’ 
based on their ‘religious status.’”160 The Court declared: “If the cases just 
described make one thing clear, it is that such a policy imposes a penalty on 
the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.”161 The 
Court thus explained that “the State’s decision to exclude [Trinity Lutheran] 
for purposes of this public program must withstand the strictest scrutiny.”162 
The Court concluded that Missouri’s action was unconstitutional “because 
it cannot survive strict scrutiny in any event.”163 
As Justice Sotomayor points out in her dissent, this is a significant 
departure from precedent. Never before had the Court held that the denial 
of aid to a religious institution had to meet strict scrutiny. Justice Sotomayor 
explained:  
[The Court’s] opinion does not acknowledge that our precedents have 
expressly approved of a government’s choice to draw lines based on 
an entity’s religious status. Those cases did not deploy 
strict scrutiny to create a presumption of unconstitutionality, as 
the Court does today. Instead, they asked whether the government 
had offered a strong enough reason to justify drawing a line based on 
that status.164  
She concluded:  
The Court offers no real reason for rejecting the balancing approach 
in our precedents in favor of strict scrutiny, beyond its references to 
discrimination. The Court’s desire to avoid what it views as 
discrimination is understandable. But in this context, the description 
is particularly inappropriate. A State’s decision not to fund houses of 
worship does not disfavor religion; rather, it represents a valid choice 
to remain secular in the face of serious establishment and free 
exercise concerns.165 
Both the majority and the dissent agree that the Court now has prescribed 
strict scrutiny when the government denies aid to religious institutions that 
it provides for secular ones. The Court is prescribing this as the general test, 
not just for the denial of aid for playground surfaces. It is familiar in 
constitutional law that the government usually loses when strict scrutiny is 
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applied,166 which means that in most instances the denial of aid to religious 
institutions will be deemed unconstitutional. 
What would be sufficient to meet strict scrutiny? Obviously, if providing 
aid to the religious institution would violate the Establishment Clause, 
complying with the Constitution would provide a compelling government 
interest justifying denial of the assistance. But short of this, there likely 
would not be a compelling government interest for denying aid. Missouri 
claimed that its goal was to stay far away from violating the Establishment 
Clause and to limit taxpayer support for religious institutions. But the Court 
explicitly rejected Missouri’s interest in going further than what was 
required by the Establishment Clause: 
 Under that stringent standard, only a state interest “of the highest 
order” can justify the Department’s discriminatory policy. Yet the 
Department offers nothing more than Missouri’s policy preference 
for skating as far as possible from religious establishment concerns. 
In the face of the clear infringement on free exercise before us, that 
interest cannot qualify as compelling. As we said when considering 
Missouri's same policy preference on a prior occasion, “the state 
interest asserted here—in achieving greater separation of church and 
State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the 
Federal Constitution—is limited by the Free Exercise Clause.”  
 The State has pursued its preferred policy to the point of expressly 
denying a qualified religious entity a public benefit solely because of 
its religious character. Under our precedents, that goes too far. The 
Department’s policy violates the Free Exercise Clause.167 
Under this view, any aid that is permissible for a religious institution to 
receive is required when it is provided to a secular institution. Consider the 
example of vouchers. Previously, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court, 
in a 5–4 ruling, said that it was constitutionally permissible for the 
government to allow vouchers to be used in parochial schools.168 The 
Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran suggests that the government must 
allow them to be used there when they can be used in secular schools. It is 
hard to identify what compelling interest would allow the government to 
deny this to parochial schools under the majority’s reasoning. And it must 
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be remembered, as the discussion of Mitchell v. Helms above indicates, the 
conservative justices on the Court reject the idea of a wall separating church 
and state and are quite unlikely to find government aid to religious 
institutions to violate the Establishment Clause. 
Second, beyond the use of strict scrutiny, the Court’s language indicates 
that this case is not just about aid for playgrounds, but likely will extend to 
all areas where the government is denying aid to religious institutions. The 
majority opinion concluded: “[T]he exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a 
public benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a 
church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and cannot stand.”169  
This clearly says that this is not just about playgrounds and not even 
about religious schools: denying a “public benefit” to a “church” is “odious” 
to the Constitution and cannot stand. It is hard to imagine a clearer 
indication that religious institutions are constitutionally entitled to any aid 
provided to secular institutions. 
Finally, as described in Part II, the Court’s attempts to distinguish Locke 
v. Davey make even clearer that the government cannot discriminate against 
religious institutions. As described above, the Court explained that “Davey 
was . . . denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do . . . . [But] 
there is no question that Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply because 
of what it is—a church.”170  
This would seem to make any denial of aid to religious schools 
unconstitutional when assistance is provided to public schools. Or for that 
matter, it would make it unconstitutional to deny religious institutions any 
aid that is provided to secular institutions. After all, the denial of aid is 
always because of what the institutions are: churches, synagogues, mosques.  
Footnote three, declaring the decision to be about playgrounds, is thus 
false judicial minimalism. There is no way to understand Trinity Lutheran 
except as a radical change in the law that likely will require government aid 
to religious institutions in virtually any instances where assistance is given 
to secular institutions, except where such aid would violate the 
Establishment Clause. 171 
IV. TREATING RELIGION DIFFERENTLY 
Parts I–III of this Article have demonstrated why the Trinity Lutheran 
decision was wrong as a matter of history, precedent, and the unwise 
direction in which it is likely to move the law. In this Part, we will argue 
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that the principal basis for the Court’s decision—a concern that 
governments are using anti-establishment concerns to unfairly single out 
religious groups for unfavorable treatment—is misguided. Quite the 
contrary, when it comes to denying government aid to religious 
organizations—and particularly houses of worship or related organizations 
that actively proselytize and promote their versions of truth—we will argue 
that there are compelling legal and normative reasons for treating them 
differently.  
On one reading of Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Trinity 
Lutheran, he appears to be treating the case as one in which the State of 
Missouri is targeting a church for unfavorable treatment out of hostile or 
invidious motives.172 Hence, his use of the term “odious” to describe the 
State’s actions,173 and his heavy reliance on the Church of Lukumi case 
where a city had attempted to prevent a church from locating there due to 
hostility towards its religious practices.174 This rhetoric made it easier for 
Roberts to justify applying strict scrutiny to Missouri’s denial of benefits to 
the church, which, in turn, essentially directed a judgment for the church (as 
the application of such scrutiny to a challenged government action typically 
does).175 
But on deeper reflection, as well as a closer reading of Roberts’s opinion, 
it seems likely that something different was going on. More plausibly, he 
and the other justices in the majority saw this as an unthinking and 
mechanical application of an antiquated anti-establishment provision of the 
Missouri Constitution to unfairly deny churches a secular public benefit 
solely on account of their religious character. Roberts himself seemed to say 
as much multiple times, despite his use of the rhetoric of invidious 
discrimination.176 
So why did Roberts resort to such rhetoric? It seems clear he was 
attempting to avoid the application of the Locke precedent, which, as 
discussed earlier, would have called for a more even-handed balancing of 
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the anti-establishment interests at stake in the case against the actual burden 
a denial of a playground grant would place on the church’s ability to freely 
exercise its religion.177 Indeed, Locke was almost directly on point to the 
question presented in Trinity Lutheran, and certainly the only precedent 
relied on by the majority that even came remotely close to addressing the 
question of whether the government was required to fund religious causes. 
Hence, one obvious criticism of the opinion is that it should have been more 
honest in its analysis, as opposed to resorting to results-oriented doctrinal 
manipulation.  
But let’s put aside this problem with the opinion and address the likely 
true concern of the Court: that it is unfair (and even “odious”) to deny a 
church or other devotional institution an equal opportunity to compete for 
public funding merely because of its religious character (and particularly 
when such funding is purportedly for a secular purpose and the Court has 
ruled that government may voluntarily provide such benefits consistent with 
the federal Establishment Clause).178 However, as benign as this concern 
may seem on its surface, it is subject to a number of objections. 
Most obviously, the Constitution itself mandates the disparate treatment 
of religious communities in regards to receiving public funding. As 
discussed earlier, the history of free exercise is in significant part about 
protecting against compelled funding of religious groups, which in turn 
makes it dubious to assert that government may provide even non-
preferential financial assistance to churches.179 And this remains true 
regardless of whether the conservatives on the modern Court want to view 
the issue exclusively in Establishment Clause terms, and read that clause to 
permit such funding out of a desire to provide greater support of religion in 
an increasingly secular society.  
Moreover, as also discussed earlier, when public funds are directed to 
churches or other worship institutions purportedly for secular purposes, they 
inevitably underwrite the devotional and proselytizing practices of those 
organizations.180 Or it becomes tempting to divert those funds to religious 
purposes, a concern which led the Court for many years to bar such aid if 
there was a risk of “excessive entanglement” between government and 
religion in policing the uses of such monies.181 
As discussed earlier, the solution of the conservative wing of the Court—
as illustrated by the plurality opinion in the Helms case—is simply to let 
such funding be used for religious purposes.182 And it seems to be where 
                                                          
177. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
178. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 31–113 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
181. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 












those justices intend the Trinity Lutheran decision to push the law, given 
the repeated assertions in the majority opinion about the unfairness of 
denying churches public funding while barely noting in a footnote (joined 
only by a plurality of justices) the significance of the fact that it was to be 
used in that case for purportedly secular purposes.183 But a principle that 
would allow (or even worse, force) the government to directly fund the 
devotional practices and proselytization efforts of various religion sects, 
would surely alarm the generations of early Americans who came to 
understand free exercise and anti-establishment protections as being 
designed in significant part to protect against those very government 
actions.  
Further, as intimated, even if the Court were right to read the Religion 
Clauses as permitting the government to voluntarily provide funding to 
religious groups as part of a generally available funding program,184 it is 
quite another thing from a rights of conscience perspective to have 
unelected judges force the government to do so. At least in the former 
situation, rights of conscience have had a chance to prevail in the resulting 
democratic decision to include religious institutions in government funding 
decisions. In such instances, any violations would presumably be confined 
to objecting minorities. But where judges compel funding through their own 
ideologically-driven interpretations of the Religion Clauses, the 
infringement of conscience rights for objectors is potentially much more 
sweeping. 
Lastly, even analyzing this issue on the majority’s own terms, it was 
nothing short of ludicrous to assert that the denial of a playground 
resurfacing grant would significantly burden the church’s free exercise of 
religion (much less “prohibit” it as the federal Constitution provides).185 
Despite the Trinity Lutheran majority’s assertion that even indirect burdens 
imposed on religious exercise can violate free exercise rights (effectively as 
a per se matter since, according to the Court, they trigger strict scrutiny),186 
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the only defense of this proposition it could muster was a reliance on a few 
inapposite precedents.187 The decision on which Roberts’s placed the most 
reliance, McDaniel v. Paty,188 was decided the way it was because there a 
class of individuals (i.e., ministers) were denied a vital political and civil 
right—the ability to hold public office—based on early state anti-
establishment concerns about clergy serving in government that had almost 
dissipated entirely by the time of that case.189 The controlling plurality 
opinion rested principally on the dissipation rationale.190 Moreover, it was 
clear the Court was also concerned about the nature and importance of the 
benefit being withheld, as well as the burden falling exclusively on a 
particular class of individuals.191 
The situation in Trinity Lutheran could not have been more different. As 
Sotomayor noted in her dissent, most states today retain constitutional 
provisions barring the public funding of devotional institutions—
evidencing continuing and strong free exercise and anti-establishment 
interests about such practices.192 Moreover, to equate a burden placed on a 
minister’s religious exercise by disqualifying him from running for public 
office with the burden placed on an entire community of believers by 
disqualifying them from competing for a playground grant is indefensible. 
                                                          
Moreover, the cases relied on in Lyng for the indirect burden proposition—ones that all involved 
indirect burdens imposed by religiously-neutral laws—were subsequently overruled or substantially 
undermined by the Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990). This effectively left the Trinity Lutheran majority with one standing precedent, 
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), to rely on for the proposition that indirect burdens intentionally 
imposed on religious groups trigger strict scrutiny and presumptively violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
And McDaniel was inapposite for reasons to be discussed. See infra notes 188–92 and accompanying 
text. As noted, the other main precedent relied on by the majority was one where a direct prohibition on 
a sect’s religious practices was imposed via invidious government discrimination. See Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). This was obviously not the situation when 
Missouri excluded Trinity Lutheran Church from its scrap-tire program due to anti-establishment 
concerns.  
Now one can certainly conceive of indirect burdens that would have the effect of significantly 
impairing a religious organization’s ability to freely exercise their religion, such as the denial of certain 
public benefits such as police or fire protection (or even, perhaps, the denial of a generally available 
grant to buy anti-terrorism barriers as Justice Alito posited in Trinity Lutheran oral arguments, see Oral 
Argument at 29:24, Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 15-577), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-577—provided there was a sufficient threat of terrorist activity to 
keep people away from worship centers without such barriers). That is why the Locke Court was correct 
to apply an analysis balancing the burden on religious exercise against the countervailing state anti-
establishment interests of a given denial of benefits. But it seems clear that the denial of a playground 
resurfacing grant to a ministry of the Trinity Lutheran church would not significantly burden its religious 
exercise.  
187. See supra note 186. 
188. 435 U.S. 618. 
189. See id. at 622–28 (plurality opinion). 
190. See id. 
191. See id. 
192. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2037 & n.10 












The former activity is an important civil and political right in our system. 
And while there may ordinarily be a right to compete on equal terms for a 
playground grant, such interests do not come near to being as weighty. 
Further, running for office is a “benefit” that is not fungible like money in 
the sense of freeing up other resources a religious institution can put to 
devotional and proselytizing purposes. Lastly, if an individual is denied the 
right to run for office, the entire burden of that action falls upon her. The 
denial of a playground grant to a church is a burden that can be spread 
among a whole community of believers who can choose to jointly fund it if 
they think it is important. 
The failure of the Trinity Lutheran majority to appreciate these 
differences in the two cases appears to be a stark statement that the Court 
no longer cares about weighing the competing interests at stake in these 
disputes, or the reasons why religion was treated differently. It is just the 
mere fact that religion was treated differently that now seems to matter. This 
is a radical departure from the approach of Justice Roberts’s mentor Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in Locke, who, as noted earlier, explicitly weighed 
Washington State’s “substantial” anti-establishment interests against the 
“relatively minor burden” placed on the plaintiff’s religious exercise in 
refusing to find a Free Exercise violation in that case.193 And this departure 
is especially ironic given that it was Chief Justice Rehnquist who largely led 
the charge over the past few decades to permit greater voluntary funding of 
religion by the government despite Establishment Clause challenges to such 
practices.194  
In addition to these historical and legal objections to the majority’s 
“unequal treatment of religion” concern, there are compelling normative 
arguments for treating religious groups differently than secular 
organizations in regards to public funding—and particularly the use of 
compulsory taxation for such purposes. Many of the reasons that persuaded 
the founding generation that compelled taxpayer funding of churches and 
similar devotional or proselytizing institutions was “of a different ilk”195 
still apply today in a way that does not apply to such funding for secular 
institutions. 
Most obviously, secular institutions do not use public money to 
underwrite devotional or proselytization activities, by which we mean the 
observance, celebration, or indoctrination of religious beliefs. But why, one 
may legitimately ask, is it a problem to compel funding to support such 
activities if a secular organization—and in particular an ideologically 
controversial one such as the National Rifle Association—might use a 
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public grant to celebrate and convince others of its views?  
The short answer is that religious belief systems differ from secular 
belief systems in ways that make it incumbent on the government not to 
force members of the public to underwrite the former even if used to foster 
the latter. Freedom of religious belief occupies a special place in our 
historical and constitutional traditions. It is the only type of belief that 
Americans have singled out in their basic charter for explicit protection 
since the founding of this country. 
There are likely many reasons for this, and it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to survey them all.196 But one key reason for this special treatment 
was explained by Madison at the beginning of his Memorial and 
Remonstrance against a proposed general tax assessment to support 
Christian ministers: 
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and 
such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is 
precedent both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the 
claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a 
member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the 
Governor of the Universe: And if a member of civil society, who 
enters into any subordinate association, must always do it with a 
reservation of his duty to the general authority; much more must 
every man, who becomes a member of any particular civil society, do 
it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We 
maintain, therefore, that in matters of religion, no man’s right is 
abridged by the institution of civil society; and that Religion is wholly 
exempt from its cognizance.197 
In other words, religious belief is different because it ordinarily entails 
the recognition of a divine sovereign to whom a person owes duties superior 
to the civil state.198 Moreover, since a person’s eternal salvation may depend 
upon the faithful performance of those duties, compulsion by the state that 
impedes that performance can cause serious harm to the adherent. Hence, 
                                                          
196. See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017) 
(surveying scholarship). 
197. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 5–
6 (Lincoln & Edmands 1819) (quoted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (appendix to 
dissenting op. of Rutledge, J.)). 
198. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1, 28–29 (2000) (“The final, and perhaps the most important, argument for the freedom of religion during 
the formative period was that religious freedom was not merely a matter of personal autonomy, but 
rather, arose from the duty of each person to worship God in accordance with the dictates of 
conscience.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense of Religious 
Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1611 (1997) (book review) (“If God does not exist, or if God 













according to Madison, religious beliefs must be as free as practicable from 
state interference in order that individual adherents may fulfill their duties 
in accordance with the dictates of their own conscience. 
In Madison’s view, that liberty includes the right not to be coerced by 
the state into funding the religious beliefs or practices of others that might 
conflict with the truths and duties prescribed by a person’s own Creator. 
Such forced complicity of taxpayers in supporting or promoting such beliefs 
could be considered a sin that might jeopardize a person’s salvation. In 
Jefferson’s words, “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for 
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and 
tyrannical.”199 And it is important to note that for Madison, the compelled 
funding principle is not limited to religious adherents. As he wrote: 
Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and 
to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we 
cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet 
yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be 
abused, it is an offence against God, not against man: To God, 
therefore, not to men, must an account of it be rendered.200 
Hence, whether one is a religious believer, an agnostic, or an atheist, an 
individual’s free exercise rights protect them from funding religious beliefs 
against their will. 
Despite the Trinity Lutheran majority’s apparent indifference to these 
principles in compelling Missouri taxpayers to support the spread of Martin 
Luther’s truths (as a matter of the church’s free exercise rights, no less), the 
Court itself as recently as a few years ago recognized their force in 
upholding even the right of a closely-held corporation not to be coerced to 
fund employee contraceptive use against its owners’ religious beliefs.201 
Two years later, the Court effectively deadlocked 4–4 on even whether 
compelling religious organizations to file a form that triggered a third-party 
insurance company’s obligation to provide objectionable contraceptives to 
their employees violated the organization’s free exercise rights.202 Of 
course, these cases involved the application of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act enacted by Congress, rather than the Free Exercise Clause 
of the Constitution. Yet the free exercise principles against compelled 
complicity in acts violating one’s religious beliefs are the same whether 
mandated by statute or the Constitution, and in the former case made even 
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more compelling by having the imprimatur of greater democratic legitimacy 
supporting them. 
Undoubtedly, the Trinity Lutheran majority’s “unequal treatment of 
religion” concern was driven in part by a view that the full participation of 
churches and like faith communities in American society is a public good 
that should be encouraged. And, indeed, few would deny that religious 
organizations have done much to contribute to a better and more stable 
society by, among other things, promoting desirable civic virtues such as 
service to others. It was for these very reasons that Virginia Governor 
Patrick Henry and other prominent statesmen opposed Jefferson and 
Madison, and supported the religious assessments bill.203 Despite having 
such powerful advocates, however, the people of Virginia ultimately agreed 
that freedom of religious belief was best served not by directing public funds 
to churches to underwrite their religious exercise, but by protecting the 
voluntary choices of individuals to provide or withhold such support as their 
consciences dictated. This was a lesson the Trinity Lutheran Court failed to 
heed. 
The “higher sovereign” explanation for the historical American 
solicitude towards free religious belief also provides additional reasons for 
treating the compelled funding of religious communities differently than 
secular groups. As Madison also argued, 
[T]he [general assessment] bill implies, either that the civil 
magistrate is a competent judge of religious truths, or that he may 
employ religion as an engine of civil policy. The first is an arrogant 
pretension, falsified by the extraordinary opinions of rulers, in all 
ages, and throughout the world; the second, an unhallowed 
perversion of the means of salvation.204 
Madison’s second point goes to what was just discussed: that individual free 
exercise rights should not take a back seat to the free exercise rights of 
churches in order to further a civil policy of facilitating their contributions 
to society. 
But his first point is another powerful defense of why religious choices—
including the funding of religion—should be completely voluntary. If free 
exercise is predicated on the need for humans to discover ultimate truth for 
themselves (including to what extent divine beings exist and what they 
require of us), what possible business does the state have in such choices? 
The state is simply incompetent to promote a particular version of such 
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truth.205 And even if public aid is compelled on a non-preferential basis, as 
by directing playground improvement funding to religious groups that have 
competed for it pursuant to secular criteria, it is still compelling support for 
a particular version of religious truth (i.e., that God exists, for instance) as 
against taxpayers who do not believe that. 
Moreover, the government impartiality that is required towards religious 
truth decisions can also be imperiled by the public funding of devotional 
institutions in more subtle and insidious ways. Such funding is almost never 
provided without certain strings or conditions being attached, and, as noted 
earlier, the risk of entangling the state with religious matters in enforcing 
compliance with those conditions is what gave rise to the excessive 
entanglement bar of the Lemon test.206 While entanglement with an 
organization’s views and objectives is also a risk when enforcing 
compliance with conditions on funds provided to those of a secular nature, 
the government’s compliance decisions in the religious realm risk 
facilitating certain versions of religious truth. 
For example, let’s say the playground grant to the Trinity Lutheran 
Church—which was in actuality only designed to pay for two-thirds of the 
resurfacing project—came with the condition that it had to be used in one 
year or relinquished. The church, however, determined that it did not have 
sufficient funds of its own to do the entire project that year due to additional 
monies it was providing to Lutheran missionaries. Hence, it requested and 
received a waiver of the one-year condition (as, let’s say, any organization 
might request for good cause shown). In this case, however, a seemingly 
neutral decision as to the grant actually had the effect of facilitating 
additional proselytizing efforts by the church. This is just one potential 
example of how the public funding of religious communities can put the 
government in unacceptable positions with respect to favoring or 
disfavoring different versions of religious truth. Obviously, there is no 
similar concern when the government funds secular organizations.  
Moreover, the higher sovereign grounding for free exercise also provides 
a good account for why government funding of religion can be particularly 
                                                          
205. See McConnell, supra note 198, at 24 (“The government cannot be a competent judge of 
religious truth because there is no reason to believe that religious understanding has been vouchsafed to 
the majority, or to any governmental elite.”). It should be noted, however, that a number of leading law 
and religion scholars have not been persuaded by the views of Madison and others that compelled 
taxpayer funding of religious causes violates rights of conscience.  See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, 
Standing, Spending, and Separation: How the No-Establishment Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect 
Conscience, 54 Vill. L. Rev. 655, 670-72 (2009).  One main reason given for this view is the difficulty 
of justifying such conscientious objections based on religious versus non-religious beliefs.  See id. at 
671-72.  While it is beyond the scope of this Article to engage this debate with the depth of treatment it 
deserves, for present purposes suffice it to say that we have attempted to provide some of the more 
salient reasons that persuade us as to why religious conscience should be treated differently in the context 
of compelled funding. 
206. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 











divisive and contentious in a way that comparable funding for secular 
organizations may not be. Religious commitments are frequently central to 
a serious believer’s existence.207 Obviously, an individual’s perceptions of 
his or her duties to a supreme sovereign and how they are discharged will 
be extremely important in the lives of such persons. And while secular 
beliefs might also attain such importance, the added dimension of expected 
fidelity to a particular account of ultimate truth can make the use of one’s 
taxes to support or promote different or conflicting versions that much more 
divisive. This may explain why the public funding of parochial schools that 
include instruction in particular accounts of religious truth has proven so 
controversial. But at least those schools principally provide instruction in 
secular subjects. One can expect such divisiveness to only be heightened 
where the funding underwrites the devotional and proselytization activities 
of a church or other house of worship.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the Trinity Lutheran Court’s seeming 
concern about the unequal treatment of religion in competing for public 
funding is quite incomplete. Because of the special status of free religious 
belief in our law and history, religion does receive certain benefits that 
secular organizations do not—particularly when government acts to 
accommodate such freedom. For instance, the Court has held religious 
groups may discriminate in their hiring of employees based on their 
religious views in a way that would be illegal for secular groups to do—
even when a religious organization is engaged in secular activities.208 As 
another example, the Court has recently held that religious communities are 
immune from laws preventing discrimination on the basis of disabilities in 
choosing their leaders.209 Moreover, as noted, although the Court has 
recently gotten out of the business of granting religious exemptions to 
secular laws as a constitutional matter, Congress and many state legislatures 
have stepped up to grant such accommodations as a statutory matter—
actions the Court has ruled are consistent with the Constitution.210 
Such accommodation benefits are given to religious groups and 
individuals precisely because of the American view that there is something 
special and distinctive about religious belief. We have attempted to recount 
at least one explanation of why this is so. Yet privileges are seldom granted 
without corresponding responsibilities or obligations. And if what makes 
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religious belief special is the importance of safeguarding the voluntariness 
of decisions regarding ultimate truth by keeping the state out of them, that 
principle should control regardless of whether it works to the benefit or 
detriment of organized religious groups. In other words, protection for 
religious belief should not be viewed as a one-way ratchet, because what 
protects those groups in some situations is precisely what may work to their 
disadvantage in others. Hence, to view as unfair a state’s decision to exclude 
religious groups from competing for public funds in order to safeguard the 
religious liberty of all is a failure to see the complete picture with all its 
essential parts. 
In sum, assuming, as seems sensible, the Trinity Lutheran decision was 
really about a concern the government is treating religious groups 
differently for insufficient but legitimate reasons (rather than, as the 
majority suggested, out of an illegitimate motive of hostile discrimination), 
that concern is understandable but misguided. As we have explained, there 
are compelling historical, legal, and normative reasons for treating religious 
communities differently than secular organizations when it comes to public 
funding—and particularly coercing such funding as a constitutional matter. 
Justice Sotomayor had it exactly right when she concluded: 
History shows that the Religion Clauses separate the public treasury 
from religious coffers as one measure to secure the kind of freedom 
of conscience that benefits both religion and government. If this 
separation means anything, it means that the government cannot, or 
at the very least need not, tax its citizens and turn that money over to 
houses of worship.211  
V. A DISTURBING TREND 
Trinity Lutheran is the most recent in a line of decisions beginning in the 
Rehnquist Court and continuing through the Roberts Court that reflects a 
troubling trend—particularly on the part of the Court’s more conservative 
wing—to countenance an unhealthy alliance of church and state. Even 
though we have little doubt this movement is well intentioned, believing it 
to be motivated primarily out of a concern that religion is being driven 
unfairly from the public square, in the end we think the Court may be 
throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. In other words, out of 
a desire to forestall what the conservatives likely view as a secularization 
movement that is unfairly disfavoring religion, they are rendering decisions 
inimical to a healthy separation of church and state that most would agree 
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is vital to the wellbeing of both religious freedom and government. 
This trend has occurred mainly in the area of the Court’s Establishment 
Clause decisions, although as Trinity Lutheran demonstrates, it is now 
manifesting itself in free exercise cases as well. In the anti-establishment 
area, the Warren and Burger Courts mainly adhered to the neutrality 
principle laid down, if somewhat confusingly, by the Court in Everson.212 
This principle came to be embodied in the Lemon test, requiring that a law 
challenged as violating the Establishment Clause have a secular purpose, 
cannot have a primary effect of advancing nor hindering religion, and 
cannot excessively entangle the government with religious organizations.213 
Applying the neutrality principle, those Courts often invalidated 
government action in the three main areas of Establishment Clause conflict: 
public aid to religious organizations (and particularly parochial schools), 
government sponsorship of religious expression, and the access of religious 
speakers to public facilities or other resources.214 
Under the leadership of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, however, the 
conservative wing of the Court made substantial headway in cutting back 
on the neutrality principle, and particularly its mandate that government 
cannot support religion generally (as opposed to favoring a particular 
religious sect). In the religious aid cases, the Court did this mainly by 
transforming the neutrality requirement from one of substance into one of 
form. In other words, so long as public funding or other assistance to 
religious institutions is provided under a purportedly secular program where 
it is made generally available to all similarly situated institutions, then 
government neutrality is satisfied even if the aid is likely to be used 
predominantly by the religious ones.215 In other words, the facial neutrality 
of a program satisfies the “primary effects” prong of the Lemon test even if 
the aid disparately benefits religious institutions.216 
Moreover, the Roberts Court has effectively extended this trend of 
allowing more public aid to flow to religious schools and other institutions. 
It has done this by cutting back on the eligibility of taxpayers, as a matter 
of standing, to challenge such programs as a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.217 As discussed earlier, however, what all of these cases have missed 
(starting with Everson) is that even where such aid does not amount to a law 
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respecting the establishment of religion, it is still violating the rights of 
conscience of dissenting taxpayers—the right that historically laid at the 
core of the no-funding principle and religious freedom in general.218 
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have also made it easier for the 
government to publicly sponsor more forms of religious expression than 
their predecessor courts. While attempts by the government to sponsor 
prayer in public schools were uniformly invalidated by the Warren and 
Burger Courts as lacking a secular purpose (and hence violating the first 
prong of the Lemon test),219 the Burger Court did make one exception for 
prayers to open or close legislative sessions.220 It based this exception on a 
historical practice of such prayers extending back to the founding.221 As to 
school prayer, however, the Rehnquist Court effectively jettisoned the 
Lemon test and adopted an anti-coercion test to assess its constitutionality—
essentially asking whether participation in a prayer was required or 
psychologically coerced through peer pressure.222 Although the Court 
actually found psychological coercion of students to exist in two challenges 
to school prayer to date, presumably that test will create increased 
opportunities for sponsored school prayer where it is conducted in a truly 
voluntary setting.223 
The Roberts Court, moreover, recently latched onto the historical 
exception for legislative prayer in combination with the anti-coercion test 
to sanction the delivery of highly sectarian prayers at town council 
meetings.224 It read the anti-coercion test rather toothlessly, since there 
exists a real risk that individuals appearing before a council seeking zoning 
waivers, etc. will feel coerced into participating for fear of incurring the 
displeasure of the council members.225 This decision signals the willingness 
of the conservative members of the Roberts Court to sanction much more 
prayer in government-sponsored settings—and even prayer expressing the 
particular beliefs held by the delivering religious sect.226 
This trend of sanctioning increasing government sponsorship of religious 
expression is also present in the area of religious displays. While the Burger 
Court had a mixed record on such cases—striking down the display of a Ten 
Commandments plaque227 but upholding a holiday display containing a 
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Christmas nativity scene on the grounds that it had a predominate secular 
purpose228—the Rehnquist Court moved to the position of asserting that so 
long as there is a secular reason for a religious display, the government can 
sponsor it without discounting its religious meaning and significance.229 The 
Court also suggested it may employ the anti-coercion test for assessing 
religious displays at some point, which would virtually give the government 
carte blanche to sponsor them since a person can always avert their eyes 
from one.230 Finally, in more recent cases tangentially involving religious 
symbolism, the conservative bloc of the Roberts Court has signaled its 
desire to extend the Rehnquist Court precedents to permit greater 
government sponsorship of such displays.231 
Lastly, drawing on one Burger Court precedent, in a series of cases the 
Rehnquist Court has firmly established the free speech right of religious 
speakers to use public property to engage in religious expression (even that 
amounting to prayer or worship activities), so long as such facilities are 
made available to secular speakers.232 The Court discounted any 
Establishment Clause concerns by relying on the facial neutrality of access 
programs—the fact they are made generally available to secular and 
religious speakers—in the same way it has in the financial aid cases.233 As 
a result of these cases, lower courts have been struggling with the issue of 
whether public facilities have to be made available to host actual religious 
worship services—in effect, having the government provide the actual 
house of worship to religious adherents.234 
In sum, the net effect of all the foregoing Rehnquist and Roberts Court 
decisions is that the government will have more constitutional latitude to 
support or promote religion should democratic majorities in various geo-
political communities choose to do so. While people will likely debate 
whether this is a positive or negative development, one aspect of this trend 
that seems particularly troubling is the de facto preference this can provide 
to majoritarian sects in a given community.  
Take, for instance, the financial aid cases. There the Court made it clear 
that so long as public funding programs are facially neutral in terms of being 
generally available to religious and secular recipients, it was not going to 
police whether the programs end up having an effect of disparately 
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benefiting religious groups generally, or even individual sects in 
particular.235 Thus, for instance, in a community where private religious 
schools are operated predominantly by the Catholic Church, such a program 
might operate to disproportionately advance Catholic religious beliefs. The 
same de facto preference could occur where public facilities, such as school 
classrooms, are provided to civic and religious groups on a facially neutral 
basis. If a given community were to consist predominantly of Protestant 
faiths, for example, obviously the basic tenets of those faiths might be 
disproportionately advanced by such aid relative to minority faiths 
(assuming relatively equal use by various religious groups). 
This reluctance to police for de facto preferences produced by facially 
neutral policies was also on full display in the recent town council prayer 
decision.236 There, despite a policy that purportedly allowed leaders of all 
local faiths to give prayers, because the community was made up 
predominantly of Christian sects, the prayers ended up being highly 
sectarian in character for lengthy intervals of time.237 In response to the 
argument that the town should have required the prayers to be more 
ecumenical, the Court responded that the government has no business in 
policing prayer content.238 Under this reasoning, then, majoritarian faiths in 
given communities will undoubtedly have their sectarian beliefs 
disproportionately promoted in situations where the government is allowed 
to sponsor them pursuant to the anti-coercion test or historical exception 
principle. 
Finally, the reluctance of the Court to police the content of sponsored 
religious expression for inclusion and diversity will likely result in the 
provision of de facto preferences to majoritarian sects in the area of religious 
displays. Whether the Court relies on the anti-coercion or secular purpose 
principles to permit more such sponsorship, the religious beliefs likely to be 
reflected in displays chosen through democratic processes in given 
communities will be those of the majority.239 While minority faiths might 
argue for inclusion in any such displays, ultimately it would be up to the 
political representatives of majority communities as to whether to include 
them or not.240  
This recent trend of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, then, of loosening 
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Establishment Clause restraints on government support for religion 
generally, combined with the Court’s refusal to ensure that such support or 
promotion is not flowing disparately to majoritarian sects, threatens to 
create a de facto establishment of those sects on a community-by-
community basis—all to the disadvantage of minority sects located in such 
communities. Such sectarian preferences by the government, whether 
intentional or not, should be concerning to those who care about religious 
freedom. Certainly they run counter to the very core of what the 
Establishment Clause was designed to avoid. And now with the Court using 
the federal Free Exercise Clause to invalidate state anti-establishment 
provisions that might otherwise stem the tide of greater government 
involvement in religious matters, this trend only threatens to become 
worse—all to the detriment of that healthy separation of church and state, 
which is required to truly safeguard religious liberty.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that a constitutional principle that compels the 
government to provide funding to religious communities whenever it makes 
comparable aid available to secular groups runs contrary to our 
constitutional history, the Court’s precedents, and compelling arguments for 
treating religion differently in this regard. When the government makes a 
decision not to fund religion in order to protect free exercise and anti-
establishment values long embodied in our constitutional charters, this does 
not constitute a form of invidious discrimination as suggested by the Trinity 
Lutheran majority. Rather, such a decision is grounded in the best traditions 
of our country to respect the religious (or non-religious) conscience of every 
individual, including their decisions about which religious beliefs merit 
their financial support and which do not. 
To belittle such considerations as a mere “policy preference for skating 
as far as possible from religious establishment concerns”241 fails to 
appreciate the historic nature and gravity of the interests at stake in such 
cases. It is also arrogantly dismissive of a state’s decision to maintain a 
greater separation of church and state than the more conservative members 
of the Court have modernly interpreted the Establishment Clause to 
provide—leaving one to wonder whether their paeans to federalism in other 
cases expressed serious commitments or convenient slogans. 
If the Court’s main concern was that churches should have the same right 
as other organizations to protect the knees of their playing children, then 
                                                          












perhaps its lapse in judgment in this case was understandable. But as Justice 
Sotomayor rightly pointed out, “[t]he stakes are higher. This case is about 
nothing less than the relationship between religious institutions and the civil 
government”242—that is, maintaining the proper separation of religion and 
the state essential to the vitality of both. If the Court’s error remains 
confined to compelling funding for arguably secular uses, it will still be 
serious but an error nonetheless. If Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have their 
way, and the Court ends up interpreting the Free Exercise Clause to force 
governments to provide funds that could be used directly for the devotional 
or proselytization activities of religious communities, then its error will be 
truly grave indeed. 
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